CNI News 

April 23, 2026

Political analysts suggest that although a transitional government has emerged in Myanmar, ASEAN is likely to fully reintegrate the country only if President U Min Aung Hlaing demonstrates genuine reforms.

ASEAN has consistently called for the implementation of its Five-Point Consensus, which includes: The immediate cessation of violence. Constructive dialogue among all parties concerned. The appointment of a special envoy to facilitate mediation.

Provision of humanitarian assistance through ASEAN. The special envoy’s visit to Myanmar to meet all parties.

Political analyst Dr. Aung Myo told CNI News that if the new government successfully achieves national reconciliation, Myanmar could reintegrate into the ASEAN community even without strictly following every point of the consensus.

A meeting of the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) in progress.

"Essentially, massive reform is needed. The reforms during U Thein Sein’s era were often superficial and lacked substance in certain areas. This time, there must be meaningful, substantive reform. On the other hand, the NLD failed to implement reforms and misled the public with inconsistent rhetoric. If we avoid those two paths, keep our promises to the people, and implement reforms more substantive than those of the U Thein Sein era, ASEAN will naturally welcome us back and invite us to participate." — Dr. Aung Myo

Analysts noted that the previous State Administration Council (SAC) showed weak implementation of the Five-Point Consensus, possibly because the military felt such steps were unnecessary. However, with a general election concluded and a formal government established—coupled with backing from major powers like China and Russia at the UN—some experts believe ASEAN will eventually have to invite the President to meetings.

The process of reintegration may, however, expose divisions within the regional bloc. Political analyst U Gyi Myint pointed out the differing stances among member states to CNI News.

President U Min Aung Hlaing meeting with Thai Deputy PM and Foreign Minister Mr. Sihasak.

"The government will do its job and try its best to regain full ASEAN membership. There is a split between the mainland and maritime states. Mainland countries like Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos are likely to support Myanmar. However, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines may not agree yet. We have to see how the new Foreign Minister handles this and how much support China provides. ASEAN operates on a consensus basis; if one country objects, a decision cannot be made." — U Gyi Myint

Following the 2025 general election, the transitional government led by U Min Aung Hlaing was formed on April 10, 2026.

Diplomatic activity has already increased. On April 22, 2026, Thailand's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sihasak, visited Myanmar to meet with President U Min Aung Hlaing to discuss improving relations with ASEAN. Additionally, Chinese Foreign Minister Mr. Wang Yi is expected to visit Myanmar this month for talks with the President.

CNI News 

April 23, 2026

Military and political analysts are pointing out that the transitional government led by President U Min Aung Hlaing must have a clear plan of action should Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) fail to respond to the latest peace invitation.

On April 20-21, 2026, President U Min Aung Hlaing invited both Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signatories and non-signatories to engage in peace talks by a deadline of July 31, 2026. The invitation specifically included the KNU, CNF, and ABSDF—groups that have signed the NCA but have not met with the government for five years.

Sai Htay Aung, Chairman of the Tai-Leng (Shanni) Nationalities Development Party (TNDP), told CNI News that the government needs to take decisive military action if negotiations with EAOs prove unsuccessful.

Sai Htay Aung and other representatives at an NCA anniversary event.

"There is talk of negotiating on one hand, but if that fails, the government must be prepared to wage an all-out offensive. Both sides claim to want a democratic federal union; so, can they not negotiate on that? The government should have a clear policy: set a timeframe for talks, and if no agreement is reached, eliminate the threat. This government needs to be both flexible and firm. My view of the current political landscape is that while the government extends an invitation for peace, it will simultaneously apply military pressure. If they don't come to the table, military tensions will likely escalate. We are already seeing this with the KIA completely closing the Hpakant road. I believe if there is no response to the invitation, the government will resort to a military solution." — Sai Htay Aung

He further emphasized that the government must strictly adhere to the frameworks laid out in the NCA to rebuild trust. He noted that deviations from the NCA framework give opposing groups reasons to doubt the government's sincerity, turning the process into what he called a "peace show for the world."

Since February 1, 2021, the armed conflict in Myanmar has expanded significantly, with numerous new groups emerging. While the military and government have lost territory, EAOs have focused on consolidating territorial control. Some groups have moved their aspirations beyond federalism toward confederation or total independence.

Analysts suggest that while the new administration may bring opportunities for dialogue, the military situation remains on a hair-trigger.

Leaders from various sectors attending an NCA commemoration.

U Khun Sai, a veteran of the peace process, advised CNI News that the talks would be most effective if conducted without rigid preconditions.

"It would be best to meet without prior conditions in the first stage. If conditions must be set, they should be mutually agreed upon. Starting a meeting by demanding the other side accept the 2008 Constitution or the NCA—no matter how legally valid they were in the past—will not work for an initial encounter. During President U Thein Sein's time, he issued an invitation on August 18. No one came in September, and there was only minor movement in October. Negotiations only truly began in November. If it was that difficult then, it will be at least twice as hard and take twice as long now. The government must be prepared for this." — U Khun Sai

Experts conclude that for a truly inclusive peace process to succeed, there must be a restoration of trust and a high level of accountability and responsibility from all parties involved.

CNI News

April 23, 2026

Military and political analysts are questioning whether the NUG and CRPH will be included in the peace invitation extended by the transitional government led by President U Min Aung Hlaing.

On April 21, 2026, President U Min Aung Hlaing invited both Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signatories and non-signatories—specifically naming the KNU, CNF, and ABSDF, who signed the NCA but have not engaged in dialogue between 2021 and 2025—to participate in peace talks by a deadline of July 31.

Colonel Khun Okkar, Chairman of the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO-NCA/S), told CNI News that the invitation appears to prioritize groups that signed the NCA but later walked away. He noted that since these groups have formed a federalist coalition that includes the NUG, their return to the peace process could potentially bring the NUG and CRPH to the table.

President U Min Aung Hlaing.

"They are extending a practical invitation. The priority seems to be the groups that signed the NCA and then left. The recently formed 'Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Union' (SCEF) is centered around the NUG and CRPH. This looks like a move to lay down a platform so that the NUG and CRPH can eventually have a seat at the negotiating table. It ensures that the groups providing that platform are not left out. However, if the NCA remains the primary foundation, the groups that signed and then withdrew—specifically the CNF and KIA—could be recalled first. Since they left claiming the NCA was void, their return might involve gathering their allies into this new coalition to gain leverage. We will have to wait and see how the actual negotiations unfold." — Colonel Khun Okkar

On March 30, 2026, opposition forces announced the formation of the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Union (SCEF). This council includes: Kachin Independence Organization (KIO/KIA),Karen National Union (KNU),Chin National Front (CNF),Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP),National Unity Government (NUG), Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH).

KIA leader Lieut-Gen Gun Maw has previously stated to the media that the KIA will only engage in peace talks if the NUG-PDF are included, and has questioned whether the military is prepared to accept them in discussions. Since the President invited the KNU, CNF, and ABSDF—who are now part of the SCEF—the situation suggests they may demand NUG-CRPH participation as a condition for talks.

The announcement of the SCEF formation on March 30, 2026.

However, political analyst Dr. Aung Myo expressed skepticism to CNI News, suggesting that while the KNU and CNF might attend, the inclusion of the NUG-CRPH remains unlikely.

"The KNU and CNF have existed for a long time. But logically, two lions cannot inhabit the same cave. They won't tolerate the NUG. Since the NUG is composed of people from the mainland Bamar majority, [the military] will not let them in. Ethnic groups like the CNF and KNU might say they accept 'two lions in a cave' on their side, but the government likely won't. I don't see a scenario for their inclusion. Real implementation is what matters most. The government could achieve more by decentralizing power and sharing the budget within the framework of the 2008 Constitution. Showing practical progress in states would be more effective than just talk." — Dr. Aung Myo

Various leaders of Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs).Various leaders of Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs).

On April 20, 2026, President U Min Aung Hlaing stated that he invites all groups that have yet to meet for talks to do so by July 31, emphasizing the need for peace and stability for national development. He warned that groups making impossible demands just to sustain their organizations would be making a mistake, and the State would have to take necessary actions.

Currently, the NCA signatories include: RCSS, PNLO, ALP, DKBA, KNU/KNLA-PC, LDU, NMSP, CNF, KNU, and ABSDF.

Non-signatories include: KIA, SSPP, UWSA, KNPP, and NDAA.

The military’s official stance regarding newer armed groups that emerged after February 1, 2021—including the AA, TNLA, MNDAA, SNA, and NSCN—remains unclear.

CNI News 

April 23, 2026

U Khun Sai, an active participant in the peace process, told CNI News that it will be difficult for the new government led by President U Min Aung Hlaing to secure a new Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) within its first 100 days.

However, he noted that the government might have specific internal benchmarks for what level of progress they hope to achieve during this initial period.

"I believe U Min Aung Hlaing himself realizes that obtaining a new NCA within 100 days is not easy. Back during President U Thein Sein’s era, even with only 21 groups involved, it took nearly two years to reach ceasefire agreements. Now, with hundreds of groups, it could take even longer. If conditions are favorable, it might be shortened, but that depends largely on the President’s magnanimity and breadth of vision. He likely knows a total resolution is unlikely in 100 days, but he may have set a specific stage of the process as his goal." — U Khun Sai

President U Min Aung Hlaing’s administration has announced its 100-day plan, which includes a priority on peace negotiations. The government has invited the PDF, NCA signatories, and non-signatory Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) to engage in talks between April 20 and the July 31 deadline.

The original signing ceremony of the NCA.

In an April 20 speech, the President emphasized his desire for peace, stating that national development is impossible without stability.

Political analyst Dr. M Kawn La pointed out that several EAOs left out of the original NCA negotiations have since grown significantly in strength. He argued that any successful dialogue must now include these powerful actors.

"The three northern groups that were left out of the original NCA are now very powerful and control their own territories. As the Union government transitions, bargaining and dialogue are inevitable. Whether we call it 'NCA Plus' or something else, achieving an all-inclusive ceasefire requires the participation of everyone. Groups like the AA, TNLA, and MNDAA have reached a status that must be factored into the equation." — Dr. M Kawn La

Since 2021, the political landscape has shifted drastically, with armed conflicts expanding and hundreds of new armed groups emerging. Many established EAOs now hold significant territorial gains.

Colonel Khun Okkar, Chairman of the PNLO (NCA/S), suggested that while the NCA must remain the platform for peace, it requires a "Political Reform" to address those who have left the agreement or were never part of it.

Attendees at a previous NCA anniversary commemoration.

"The NCA route is still the primary platform. We have to go with an 'NCA Plus' model. You can't just discard the NCA; it is legally established, and seven groups still stand by it. The government’s NSPNC (National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee) also remains intact. We need to analyze how to bring back those who walked away and how to invite those who were never involved. This will require political reform, and we must wait and see how they implement those changes." — Colonel Khun Okkar

Original Signatories (Oct 15, 2015): KNU, RCSS, KNU/KNLA-PC, DKBA, ALP, ABSDF, CNF, and PNLO.

Later Signatories (Feb 13, 2018): NMSP and LDU.

Current Status: The KNU, CNF, and ABSDF have effectively withdrawn and are in active combat with the military. The ALP, PNLO, LDU, and NMSP have experienced internal splits.

Non-Signatories & New Groups: Questions remain regarding the peace track for the KIA, SSPP, UWSA, KNPP, NDAA, and groups that gained prominence after 2021, such as the AA, TNLA, MNDAA, SNA, and NSCN.

CNI Interview

April 24, 2026

In Myanmar, the President of the new transitional government, U Min Aung Hlaing, offered a peace invitation by designating a 100-day period from April 20 to July 31. 

Subsequently, on April 21, 2026, the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Central Committee (NSPCC) issued an announcement inviting ethnic armed organizations (EAOs)—including those that have signed the NCA, those that have not, and those that signed but have not engaged in talks between 2021 and 2025—to participate in peace talks by the July 31 deadline.

CNI News Agency contacted U Khun Sai, an active participant in the peace process, to discuss these developments.

CNI: The period from April 20 to July 31 has been set as a "100-day" window. This includes inviting the PDF to enter the "legal fold," as well as both NCA signatories and non-signatories. What is your view on this?

U Khun Sai: We should welcome it. As he said, when working to develop the country, if the country is not peaceful, development is impossible—this is true. He likely knows this best. I personally welcome this initiative.

However, I see that it will be mostly difficult. This is because four months after President U Thein Sein took office, he issued an announcement on August 18, 2011, inviting Myanmar citizens abroad to return and help rebuild the country, and he invited all revolutionary organizations to come and discuss peace. But at that time, not a single group came.

The groups they eventually met were those that already had existing ceasefire agreements, such as the Wa (UWSA), Kokang (MNDAA), Mong La (NDAA), and DKBA. But among the groups actively engaged in revolutionary armed struggle, not one came. They simply did not trust the process. Consequently, in October, U Aung Min and U Soe Thein were assigned to go to the Thai border. They traveled there to negotiate for peace but were unsuccessful.

Eventually, U Harn Yawnghwe assisted through the National Reconciliation Program, as he maintained contact with all EAOs. Because of his help, five groups eventually agreed. It was only then, in November, that discussions finally took place.

If it was that difficult during U Thein Sein’s time, I think it will be even more difficult in the current situation. Therefore, if the invitation is just "come to where I am," it will not be easy for armed groups to show up. However, if they [the government] go to where the groups are located, the possibility of success is much higher. Even then, they will likely have to work harder than U Aung Min and U Soe Thein did. I pray for their success.

President U Min Aung Hlaing.

CNI: The invitation only mentions "inviting" but doesn't specify how the discussions will happen or how they should come. What is your take on this vague invitation?

U Khun Sai:  There might be some differences. During U Thein Sein’s time, there were no immediate pre-conditions. They followed up and negotiated with every group. The first priority was a ceasefire. Step one was the ceasefire; step two was that they could keep their arms but would continue to negotiate. No rigid policies were set initially.

Later, U Thein Sein tried to set some policies—what could and couldn't be done—and the EAOs rejected them. They said they did not accept the 2008 Constitution. We agreed to discuss without basing it on the Constitution, and decided that how to handle the Constitution would be determined later based on our agreements. This led to the NCA (Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement) becoming a reality.

Currently, U Min Aung Hlaing has the NCA framework as a foundation. However, while some people have truly worked on and studied the NCA, there are many others who will say, "I won't accept it just because U Min Aung Hlaing is doing it." There needs to be a very clear and transparent discussion so everyone understands. Specifically, the NCA contains a section on basic and guiding principles: we will establish a federal democratic union and solve political problems through political means. I believe no group can argue against these principles if they are explained properly.

Except for groups wanting total independence or a confederation, I see no reason to reject them. Another thing is that there must be guarantees for those who come to talk—that they can keep their arms, won't be prosecuted, and that previous declarations as "unlawful associations" or "terrorist groups" will be suspended. Without such guarantees, it will be difficult.

The peace invitation announcement from the NSPCC.

CNI: Most analysts suggest that for the first year or two under the new government, peace talks won't be fully effective due to various crises. Now that the President himself has announced these actions within 100 days, what kind of guarantees do you think allow him to make such a statement?

U Khun Sai:  I think U Min Aung Hlaing himself knows that achieving a "new NCA" within 100 days is not easy. During U Thein Sein’s time, when there were only 21 groups, it took about two years just to reach ceasefire agreements. Now that there are hundreds of groups, this could take even more time.

If conditions are favorable, it could be shorter, but that depends heavily on the President. I think it depends on the breadth and greatness of his mindset. He likely knows that finishing everything in 100 days is impossible, but he may have a specific stage or milestone he wants to reach within that time frame.

CNI: Could there be involvement from neighboring countries in these 100-day activities?

U Khun Sai: Neighboring countries want Myanmar to be peaceful. China, India, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Laos all want peace here. I believe they will help in whatever way they can.

The peace invitation announcement from the NSPCC.

Specifically, during U Thein Sein’s era, representatives probably traveled to Thailand no less than 100 times. Thailand not only allowed the meetings; they also facilitated them to run smoothly. Furthermore, they didn't interfere—they didn't set rules like "negotiate this way" or "that way." It was very convenient. I believe Thailand and other neighbors will continue this approach this time as well.

CNI: The President said the invitation lasts until July 31. Does this imply that there will be no more invitations after that date? How do you interpret that?

U Khun Sai:  This is politics. In our experience, once a process starts and reaches a certain point, extending the deadline is common practice. I don't expect a complete cutoff without an extension. If that were to happen, the words the President spoke yesterday would be like "pouring water into the sand" (wasted effort).

CNI: Do you have any final thoughts to add?

U Khun Sai: Peace only has hope when the person making it is peaceful themselves. For example, President U Thein Sein was a very peaceful person, which is why his work was successful.

Similarly, we want President U Min Aung Hlaing to be a peaceful leader like U Thein Sein. If one’s own heart is aflame, it is impossible to go and extinguish other fires—he knows this best himself. Therefore, I pray that U Min Aung Hlaing is peaceful in both mind and body. If he works with a peaceful heart, he will succeed.

CNI News

 April 24, 2026

A total of 517 members of the People’s Defense Force (PDF) contacted the Central Command (La-Pa-Kha) in Mandalay Region to surrender and "enter the light."

A ceremony to mark the surrender of the 517 PDF members and their subsequent return to their families was held on April 24, 2026, in Mandalay, within the territory of the Central Command.

The group of 517 individuals includes: 47 women, 470 men. Additionally, it is reported that 31 firearms, along with improvised rockets (short-range rockets) and various ammunition, were handed over during the event.

CNI News

April 23, 2026

President U Min Aung Hlaing issued a proclamation on April 23, 2026, declaring a State of Emergency in more than 50 townships across nine Regions and States.

The declaration aims to effectively suppress armed insurgency and restore regional stability, peace, and the rule of law. The designated townships are distributed as follows:

Kachin State: Sumprabum, Shwegu, Injangyang, Sawlaw, and Chiwi townships. Kayah State: Shadaw, Hpasawng, and Mese townships. Kayin State: Kawkareik and Kyainseikgyi townships.

Chin State: Kanpetlet, Thantlang, Paletwa, Tonzang, Mindat, Matupi, and Falam townships. Sagaing Region: Kawlin, Pinlebu, Indaw, Pale, Wetlet, Khin-U, Kani, and Tabayin townships.

Magway Region: Pauk, Myaing, Saw, Tilin, and Yesagyo townships. Mandalay Region: Ngazun township.

Rakhine State: Ramree, Pauktaw, Ponnagyun, Rathedaung, Gwa, Maungdaw, Buthidaung, Kyauktaw, Minbya, Myebon, Mrauk-U, Thandwe, Ann, and Toungup townships.

Shan State: Namtu, Mabein, Kutkai, Namkham, Hsenwi, Kunlong, Namhsan, Mantong, Hopang, Laukkaing, Konkyan, Momeik, Kyaukme, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, and Mong La townships.

Duration: The State of Emergency order is effective starting today for a period of 90 days.

Notable Inclusion: The list includes Mong La, a township controlled by the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA-Mong La) where there is currently no active fighting.

Notable Exclusions: Interestingly, several areas controlled by the KIA (Kachin Independence Army) currently engaged in active combat—such as Pangwa, Kan Pite Tee, Momauk, and Hpakant—were not included in this specific emergency declaration.

CNI News

April 23, 2026

The Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services, General Ye Win Oo, stated that military administration requires the "spirit of a good commander" and a "fatherly spirit" rooted in empathy, emphasizing the need for unity and fairness in leadership.

He made these remarks during a meeting with officers, soldiers, and their families at the Magway Cantonment on April 22, 2026.

General Ye Win Oo highlighted that administrative capability plays a vital role within the Tatmadaw. He noted that if administration is poor, both military and organizational capabilities will suffer. Therefore, among the "three capabilities," administrative prowess is critical, as weaknesses in this area can lead to a breakdown in internal unity.

"In administration, there must be empathy, guided by the spirit of a good commander and a fatherly spirit. Administration must be harmonious and fair. Weak administration leads to weak unity. Discipline, essentially, consists of encouragements and prohibitions. A good leader must possess a sense of accountability and responsibility; they must be able to forgive what should be forgiven, while taking legal action in matters where forgiveness is not an option," the Commander-in-Chief said.

General Ye Win Oo further explained that the Tatmadaw cannot operate outside its established disciplinary framework, and thus, a breach of discipline is considered a crime. While it is necessary to consistently maintain a disciplined and high-quality military, he cautioned that leaders must be careful to avoid extreme or excessive restrictiveness.

Furthermore, he remarked that the public and the Tatmadaw are inseparable and must work to remain united and affectionate. He stated that the military is responsible for national defense 24 hours a day and must actively promote the interests of the people.

General Ye Win Oo rose to the position of Commander-in-Chief from his previous role as Chief of Military Security Affairs (C-MSA).

The current President, U Min Aung Hlaing, officially transferred the duties of the Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services to him on March 30, 2026.

CNI News

April 23, 2026

Colonel Khun Okkar, Chairman of the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO-NCA/S)—a signatory to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)—told CNI News that the government in power from 2021 to 2025 needs to reflect on whether it fully implemented the agreements laid out in the NCA.

Following remarks from the government side urging groups not to focus solely on their own organizational survival, NCA signatory groups have countered by questioning whether the government itself has strictly adhered to and implemented the terms of the treaty.

Colonel Khun Okkar stated that the roadmap included in the NCA has stalled and interim arrangements have failed to materialize. He noted that if the NCA could be fully implemented, it would be highly satisfactory.

"There are interim arrangements included in the NCA. Since we haven't been allowed to exercise those rights, it is necessary to fully comply with the NCA's provisions. Currently, there is no full compliance with the existing stipulations. On the other hand, being told not to talk about organizational survival is one-sided, especially when the NCA signatories have plenty to say. One must ask: are all points in the NCA being strictly followed? Since this is a bilateral issue, details should be discussed later; however, setting agendas that exclude certain points or requests before a meeting even begins is a unilateral approach. Setting aside the demands, if the 33 points already agreed upon in the NCA could be implemented, it would be very good. Currently, even those signed and agreed-upon points cannot be fully realized. Therefore, I want to urge everyone to cooperate and collectively implement every point within the agreed-upon NCA," the Colonel said.

President U Min Aung Hlaing.

Colonel Khun Okkar further mentioned that based on the experiences of the last three to four years, NCA signatory groups have not received significant support, recognition, or the opportunity to access international assistance.

On April 20, 2026, during a Union Government meeting, President U Min Aung Hlaing stated that it would be a mistake if groups made impossible demands during peace negotiations simply to ensure their own organizational stability, and emphasized that the State must also perform its necessary duties.

Political analyst Dr. Aung Myo told CNI News that a separate provision should be made for organizations that have signed the NCA and truly haven't breached it—unlike the KNU.

"One of the main problems arises when these organizations try to raise funds for their survival. I understand there were efforts to clearly demarcate territories, but they haven't been implemented. This includes territory for their livelihood, government territory, and neutral zones where both sides can operate. Even if agreed upon, I hear implementation is lacking. This is a crucial task that must be done. You cannot treat those who signed the agreement the same as those who didn't. For those who signed and have truly not violated the terms—unlike the KNU—there should be a move to support their independent standing," he said.

Senior General Min Aung Hlaing with some leaders of NCA-signatory armed groups.

The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was signed between the government and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in October 2015. The agreement includes provisions for a ceasefire, the holding of national-level political dialogues, and the convening of the Union Peace Conference to achieve genuine peace.

Following these steps, it was agreed to build a Union based on democracy and federalism in accordance with the outcomes of the Union Peace Conference. While the NCA was intended not just as a ceasefire but as a foundation for political reform, it is reported that there are currently significant challenges in implementing its provisions.