CNI News

April 22, 2026

Political analysts and diplomats are closely observing whether the upcoming visit of Thailand’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sihasak, to Myanmar can end the country’s isolation and facilitate its reintegration into ASEAN.

President U Min Aung Hlaing stated during the first regular session of the Third Union Parliament (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) on April 10, 2026, that as Myanmar is an ASEAN member state, it will strive to restore regular relations with the bloc. 

Mr. Sihasak is scheduled to arrive in Myanmar on April 22, 2026, and is expected to meet with President U Min Aung Hlaing. This will be the first visit by an ASEAN member state official to the new government following the elections in Myanmar.

A political analyst told CNI News that the stance of neighboring Thailand is crucial for improving relations between Myanmar and ASEAN. He suggested that progress is possible if the government implements ASEAN’s consensus agreements.

The vacant Myanmar seat at an ASEAN meeting.

"It depends on the decisions of the respective governments and how Myanmar responds. If Thailand is satisfied with the response, they will report back to their government. If the Thai government recognizes [the new administration], other countries might follow suit. Currently, most countries are reluctant to recognize the elections or the appointment of Min Aung Hlaing as President; only a minority holds a more flexible view. Thailand acts as a neutral and influential mediator, making its stance vital," the analyst said.

He further noted that while U Min Aung Hlaing agreed to the ASEAN 5-Point Consensus, ASEAN has been dissatisfied with the lack of implementation. "Myanmar’s response is critical. If there is hope in the response, and if Thailand leads with recognition, others may follow."

President U Min Aung Hlaing is also scheduled to visit China and meet with President Xi Jinping. The analyst added that the response to the Thai diplomat is even more significant because it occurs before the China trip.

"China also wishes to see Myanmar reintegrate into ASEAN. If Myanmar remains distanced or antagonistic toward ASEAN, China likely won't be pleased. China is pushing for reconciliation with neighbors and peaceful dialogue to resolve internal conflicts. Therefore, this meeting before the China trip must be handled with care."

President U Min Aung Hlaing with the Thai delegation seen

U Thein Tun Oo, Director of the Strategic Studies Group, told CNI News that Mr. Sihasak's visit might focus more on Thai-Myanmar bilateral cooperation than on ASEAN-Myanmar relations.

Key Areas of Focus: Border security and the resumption of trade.

Historical Ties: The two nations share deep historical links and essential operational tasks that require coordination.

ASEAN Context: U Thein Tun Oo noted that Myanmar is following its own path according to the original ASEAN Charter. He pointed out a divide within ASEAN between mainland Southeast Asian nations and archipelagic nations regarding the Myanmar issue.

"If the ASEAN community accepts Myanmar’s existence and desires a collaborative solution, they will eventually have to re-accept Myanmar," he stated.

Following the events of February 1, 2021, and the subsequent declaration of a state of emergency, ASEAN intervened in the Myanmar crisis and excluded Myanmar's military leadership from its summits.

Currently, stakeholders are watching whether the post-election government can restore ties with the bloc. Simultaneously, preparations are underway to reopen the Asian Highway and resume border trade between Thailand and Myanmar, which has been stalled for a significant period.

CNI News

April 21, 2026

Military and political observers are analyzing the potential attitudes of Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and revolutionary groups toward the peace invitation issued by the government led by President U Min Aung Hlaing, which spans from April 20 to July 31, 2026.

During a Union Government meeting on April 20, 2026, President U Min Aung Hlaing delivered a speech outlining tasks to be undertaken within a "100-day plan." Within this 100-day window (April 20 to July 31), he invited People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), EAOs that have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), and non-signatory groups to meet for peace talks.

U Khun Sai, an active participant in the peace process, told CNI News that during the initial implementation of the NCA under President U Thein Sein’s administration, negotiations were extremely difficult. He suggested that peace talks are more likely to succeed if negotiators travel to the locations where the armed groups are based.

 Leaders of armed organizations seen together.

"President U Thein Sein issued a declaration about four months after taking office. On August 18, 2011, he invited Myanmar citizens abroad to return and help develop the country, and called on all revolutionary organizations to discuss peace. But no one came. Those they did meet with were groups that already had existing ceasefire agreements, like the 'Wa', Kokang, Mongla, and DKBA. However, not a single group actively engaged in armed revolution showed up; they simply didn't trust the offer. Consequently, in October, U Aung Min and U Soe Thein were tasked with traveling to the Thai border to negotiate. Even then, they were unsuccessful until U Harn Yawnghwe assisted through the National Reconciliation Program, as he had connections with all EAOs. Only then, in November, did five EAOs agree to talk. If it was that difficult under U Thein Sein, I think it will be even harder in the current situation. Because of these difficulties, it is unlikely EAOs will come if they are told 'come to where I am.' It is much more likely to happen if the government goes to where they are, though it will require even more effort than U Aung Min and U Soe Thein exerted," U Khun Sai said.

President U Min Aung Hlaing stated that he is inviting groups that have not yet engaged in dialogue to do so by the July 31 deadline. He emphasized that the government desires peace, noting that national development is impossible without stability and tranquility.

Dr. Hla Kyaw Zaw, an observer of China-Myanmar affairs, suggested to CNI News that this 100-day peace invitation might be a strategic move to secure an invitation for Myanmar to attend next month’s ASEAN summit.

 During the ceremony marking the anniversary of the NCA.

"There might be things he was pressured to do from the start, perhaps pressure from China or ASEAN. Currently, it’s possible this is being done to get invited to the ASEAN meeting next month. It’s like setting off fireworks to be noticed and invited. But how can this succeed? Consider whether it’s possible to end a 70-year-old civil war in just 100 days. If no one else could achieve it in a lifetime, could he?" she remarked.

The NCA was originally signed on October 15, 2015, by the Karen National Union (KNU), Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), KNU/KNLA-PC, Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF), Chin National Front (CNF), and Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO). On February 13, 2018, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) also signed.

Currently, the KNU, CNF, and ABSDF have effectively withdrawn from the NCA and are in active combat with the Myanmar military. Furthermore, groups like the ALP, PNLO, LDU, and NMSP have split into internal factions.

Questions remain regarding which peace track will be used for the KIA, SSPP, UWSA, KNPP, NDAA, AA, TNLA, MNDAA, SNA, NSCN, and the new armed groups that emerged after February 1, 2021.

CNI News

22 April 2026

The peace invitation extended within the first 100 days of the new government should prioritize ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) that have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), Colonel Khun Okkar, Chairman of the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO-NCA/S), told CNI News.

On April 20, 2026, President U Min Aung Hlaing issued an invitation for both NCA-signatory and non-signatory EAOs to engage in peace talks by a deadline of July 31. He specifically mentioned inviting groups like the KNU, CNF, and ABSDF, who have signed the NCA but have not met for talks in over five years.

Regarding the negotiation process, Colonel Khun Okkar suggested that the government must decide whether to prioritize those who withdrew from the NCA or those who have consistently remained on the NCA path.

"As far as I know, formal invitations haven't been sent yet. The 100-day plan has only been presented in principle. There are no specific directives for practical implementation yet, so we can't say they’ve been officially invited. We have to wait and see how the invitation process is carried out," Colonel Khun Okkar said.

President U Min Aung Hlaing

He continued, "Will they first invite the three groups that left the NCA—the CNF, KNU, and ABSDF? They were part of the NCA but later withdrew. However, priority should definitely be given to the groups currently following the NCA path. Based on the experience of the last three or four years, NCA-signatory groups haven't received significant support, recognition, or access to international aid. Now that the government led by the President is officially in place, they need to support and encourage NCA signatories more to strengthen the NCA path. This is my suggestion to elevate the government's stance on the NCA."

Meanwhile, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Karen National Union (KNU), Chin National Front (CNF), and Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)—all currently in active conflict with the Myanmar military—have joined forces with the National Unity Government (NUG). On March 30, they formed the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF).

The political objectives of the SCEF include: Eliminating the military dictatorship. 

Ending military involvement in politics. Placing all armed forces under civilian government control. Abolishing the 2008 Constitution.

Drafting a new constitution based on federalism and democracy.  Building a new Union in accordance with the new constitution. Establishing justice processes for victims of conflict.

President U Min Aung Hlaing stated that it would be a mistake if organizations only focus on their own survival by demanding impossible terms during peace negotiations.

Political analyst U Htet Aung Kyaw told CNI that it might be better to focus on matters that can achieve rapid success rather than long-term peace goals within a 100-day framework.

Senior General Min Aung Hlaing meeting with some leaders of non-signatory armed groups

"If armed groups don't come to the peace talks within these 100 days, the government will have to keep inviting and negotiating. They are our own citizens. No matter which government is in power, if groups don't come, you have to find a way to bring them in. The government needs to consider how to build high enough trust—without restrictions—to make them want to talk. They need to find a middle ground where the desires of both sides meet," U Htet Aung Kyaw said.

He added, "Placing a long-term issue like total peace into a 100-day plan makes it unlikely to succeed. Thinking that Myanmar will be peaceful within 100 days is unrealistic. Including such massive goals in a 100-day window is a bit unusual. It would be better to focus on the most achievable successes first."

The NCA was originally signed on October 15, 2015, by the KNU, RCSS, KNU/KNLA-PC, DKBA, ALP, ABSDF, CNF, and PNLO. On February 13, 2018, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) also joined.

Currently: The KNU, CNF, and ABSDF have effectively withdrawn from the NCA and are fighting the military.

Groups like the ALP, PNLO, LDU, and NMSP have split into factions.

Questions remain regarding the peace process path for other major groups (KIA, SSPP, UWSA, KNPP, NDAA, AA, TNLA, MNDAA, SNA, NSCN) and the new armed groups that emerged after February 1, 2021.

CNI News
April 21, 2026

The National Solidarity and Peacemaking Central Committee (NSPCC) issued a statement on April 21, 2026, inviting Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) to participate in peace negotiations.

In the invitation, the President-led NSPCC stated its belief that in implementing the peace process, it is essential to end armed conflicts and resolve political issues through political means.

The NSPCC’s statement further extended a formal invitation to hold free and unconditional discussions to implement peace processes necessary for national development, stability, and tranquility.

The invitation is addressed to: Armed groups that have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). Armed groups that have not yet signed the NCA. Armed groups that previously signed the NCA but have since withdrawn.

CNI News

April 21, 2026

The first meeting of the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) under Myanmar’s new government was held on April 21, 2026, in Nay Pyi Taw.

The meeting was attended by: President: U Min Aung Hlaing, Vice Presidents: U Nyo Saw and Daw Nan Ni Ni Aye, Speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw: U Khin Yi,  Speaker of the Amyotha Hluttaw: U Aung Lin Dwe, Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services: General Ye Win Oo, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services: General Kyaw Swar Lin, Minister of Defense: General Tun Aung, Minister of Home Affairs: Lieutenant General Nyunt Win Swe, Minister of Border Affairs: Lieutenant General Phone Myat, Minister of Foreign Affairs: U Tin Maung Swe.

During the session, the council discussed several critical issues, including:  Peace Process: Matters regarding national stability and peace initiatives. Economy: General economic affairs and development. Anti-Corruption: Ensuring the integrity and elimination of corruption within the Myanmar Armed Forces, the Myanmar Police Force, and administrative officials. ASEAN Cooperation: Matters related to collaborating with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Energy Crisis: Issues surrounding the current fuel oil shortages and crises.

CNI News

April 21, 2026

Rice cultivation in Myanmar could decline by up to 10% due to the current fuel crisis, according to various farmers' associations.

Because there is no specific fuel quota allocated for farmers, they are forced to purchase fuel on the black market for nearly 3 million MMK per barrel—if they can even find it at all.

U Thein Aung, former chairman of the Farmers Development Association, told CNI News that rice cultivation for this year’s rainy season could drop by 10%, and even in areas where planting does occur, about 50% of the work will be done haphazardly rather than systematically.

"Regarding the rainy season paddy, under the current situation, fields with uncertain yields or unreliable water access won't be farmed if fuel remains scarce. Those who usually plant two crops a year will likely scale back to just one. In the Ayeyarwady Region, the total acreage might only drop by about 10% because some farmers have no choice but to plant. However, the extent of systematic and proper cultivation will likely drop by 50%," he said.

 Farmers irrigating their fields.

Farmers reported that although fuel sales for agricultural purposes require recommendations from local administrators, they are still unable to obtain sufficient supplies.

While the Rice Millers Association occasionally sells fuel quotas at 1.9 million MMK per barrel, farmers on the ground are often forced to pay between 2.6 million and 3 million MMK.

U Aye Myint, a farmer from Kyaunggon Township, told CNI News that regular cultivation will only be possible if fuel is distributed through a quota system managed by the relevant Departments of Agriculture and village administrators.

A fuel station seen in Myanmar.

"The acreage for rain-fed paddy is already recorded at the village tract level, the Township Agriculture Office, and the Township General Administration Office. For example, if a village tract has 1,000 acres, they should be allocated 2 gallons per acre—totaling 2,000 gallons. If village administrators were responsible for collecting the total amount for the entire group and redistributing it, it would truly support the agricultural sector. That way, we could farm every year without the industry being hampered," he said.

Farmers noted that despite rising fuel prices, the price they receive for their paddy remains between 1.2 million and 1.6 million MMK per 100 baskets. They explained that a profit is only possible if an acre yields 150 baskets; those yielding less are facing financial losses.

Furthermore, the World Food Programme (WFP) has released a statement noting that Myanmar is facing a dire situation. This is due to rising prices and shortages of fuel and fertilizer driven by conflicts in the Middle East, forcing a reduction in agricultural inputs.

CNI News

April 21, 2026

Military and political analysts are pointing out that the TNLA (Ta'ang National Liberation Army) appears to be in a "tight spot" (between a rock and a hard place) in northern Shan State. This follows military friction with other armed groups and the sending of a congratulatory message to the government of President U Min Aung Hlaing.

The TNLA launched Operation 1027 on October 27, 2023, attacking the Myanmar military and seizing control of 12 towns across northern Shan State.

However, by 2025, the group lost Naungcho, Kyaukme, Mogok, and Momeik back to the Myanmar military. Furthermore, its ally, the MNDAA (Kokant Army), launched an offensive against Kutkai and Namkham, forcing the TNLA to cede Kutkai and enter into a ceasefire agreement with the MNDAA.

Amidst these developments, the TNLA sent a congratulatory message on April 15, 2026, welcoming the appointment of U Min Aung Hlaing as President and the formation of a new civilian government.

Sai Htay Aung, Chairman of the Tai-Leng (Shanni) Nationalities Development Party (TNDP), told CNI News that this move was unexpected and likely stems from the pressures the TNLA is facing. He also suggested a potential connection to the KIA (Kachin Independence Army).

Three top officials led by President U Min Aung Hlaing seen

"Legally, they are only entitled to Mantong and Namhsan. I have said before that no matter how much they seize, they will eventually have to withdraw. The TNLA had big ambitions, so it captured many towns. But this statement had to be issued. I don't think the timing of General Gun Maw’s (KIA) trip to northern Shan State and this statement are a coincidence.

Just like the situation with Bo Nagar, the TNLA seems to be in a tight spot. They are essentially reaching out to the government because of these crises. When you look at their past joint statements with the other two allies, we never expected them to welcome the new government. It seems they are facing a shortage of manpower due to heavy casualties in the war, alongside other external pressures," Sai Htay Aung said.

While the TNLA initially collaborated with the MNDAA, AA, KNDF, BNRA, BPLA, MDY-PDF, DPLA, and PLA during Operation 1027, relations have since soured. The TNLA reportedly expelled other armed groups—including the KIA, SSPP, MNDAA, and PDF—from the territories it captured, leading to a breakdown in military and political ties. Disputes also arose with the MNDAA specifically over the administration of the Kutkai region.

Following the TNLA’s message welcoming the new government, Ta'ang civil society organizations have issued protests, and questions have been raised regarding whether the group has abandoned its revolutionary stance.

TNLA Leaders seen

A local resident from Kyaukme told CNI News that the TNLA's shift might be due to a severe depletion of combat-ready soldiers and various other pressures.

"The TNLA's strength relied on recruiting only from the Palaung (Ta'ang) ethnicity. They don't recruit Shan, Chinese, or Bamar. Consequently, their recruitment pool in northern Shan State is almost exhausted. They have very few soldiers left capable of fighting. They have even recruited women, and they now have to consider the survival of their people. Additionally, pressure from the 'Big Black Hand' (China) is a major factor. I believe they chose this path after weighing all these circumstances," the resident said.

The TNLA had captured Mogok and Momeik in July 2024 but returned them to the Myanmar military on November 29, 2025, following mediation by the Chinese government.

Under the current 2008 Constitution, only Namhsan and Mantong are designated as the Palaung Self-Administered Zone. However, the TNLA aspires to establish a "Palaung State" comprising 12 townships: Namhsan, Mantong, Namtu, Mong Ngaw, Kyaukme, Naungcho, Mogok, Momeik, Kutkai, Namkham, Hsipaw,
Monglon

CNI News

April 21, 2026

The Chin People’s Union/Chin People’s Army (CPU/CPA) issued a statement on April 20, 2026, announcing that members of its Central Executive Committee held a meeting with Arakan Army (AA) leader General Twan Mrat Naing in an AA-controlled area of Rakhine State.

The meeting took place in Rakhine State in February 2026, following an invitation from the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA).

According to the CPU/CPA statement, the discussions covered the current progress of the Spring Revolution and ways to foster long-term mutual benefit as good neighbors between the Chin and Rakhine people. Furthermore, they were able to establish a roadmap for future joint operations.

General Twan Mrat Naing meets with CPU/CPA representatives in Rakhine State, February 2026.

The CPU/CPA stated that the visit, which lasted approximately two weeks, was highly beneficial and provided valuable learning opportunities for the organization. They expressed their heartfelt gratitude to the United League of Arakan.

The AA currently controls Paletwa Township in Chin State, as well as 14 out of the 17 townships in Rakhine State, having seized them from the Myanmar Military.

Similarly, the Myanmar Military is facing ongoing attacks across Ayeyarwady, Sagaing, and Magway Regions, as well as in Chin, Shan, and Kachin States, by the KIA, PDF, MNDAA, TNLA, and various Chin armed groups.

CNI News

April 21, 2026

It is not yet feasible to grant a political status similar to the "Wa" region to all regions and states; however, the Pa-O region is slightly closer to achieving such status compared to other areas, Colonel Khun Okkar, Chairman of the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO-NCA/S), told CNI News.

He explained that the Pa-O region is not as prominent as Mong La or the "Wa" region. In the "Wa" region, there are no groups opposing the military dictatorship, nor are there central-opposing dissidents; the United Wa State Party (UWSP) and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) maintain firm control over the territory. The Pa-O region, however, lacks that level of cohesion, making it difficult to achieve "Wa" level political status at this time.

"Furthermore, there are government institutions in the 'Wa' region—teams from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Department of Education, and social organizations assigned by the government. They are allowed to exist and operate within the territory. However, they manage their own administration, judiciary, and legal affairs. While doing so, they know how to maintain relations with the government and Naypyidaw without creating friction or obstacles. They do not accept anyone within their territory who would cause such friction. In our Pa-O region, there are still voices and elements that cause friction. We are not unified. Additionally, the leading party and the armed wing are not as cohesive as the 'Wa,' nor are they as financially independent. Up until now, Pa-O armed groups have had to rely on state support. If they could stand on their own without state aid, it might be different, but currently, all transformed People's Militia Groups (PMFs) rely on support to survive. Therefore, I’d say we haven't even reached 50% of the 'Wa' level yet," Colonel Khun Okkar said.

UWSA 'Wa' leaders seen together.

Under Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution, there is one Self-Administered Division and five Self-Administered Zones, totaling six units. "Wa" is designated as the Self-Administered Division.

The Self-Administered Zones include:  Kokang: Konkyan and Laukkai townships in Shan State. Palaung (Ta'ang): Namhsan and Mantong townships in Shan State. Danu: Ywangan and Pindaya townships in Shan State. Pa-O: Ho Pone, Hsi Hseng, and Pinlaung townships in Shan State. Naga: Lahe, Leshi, and Nanyun townships in Sagaing Region.

In the context of ending Myanmar's nearly 80-year-long armed conflict, military and political analysts are debating whether all non-Bamar ethnic groups should be granted "Wa"-style self-autonomy. Analysts told CNI News that simply granting self-administered status is not enough to end the armed conflicts.

Political analyst Dr. An Kaw La told CNI News that while some ethnicities require status as Self-Administered States or Zones, others do not. He added that even when granting such autonomy, they would need to be entirely detached from constitutional oversight.

"In our context, we can implement sub-autonomous regions or national areas. Some regions need to be given sub-autonomy status, while for others, it isn't necessary. If we practice federalism, granting 'national areas' with political rights would suffice. It depends on the approaches to elections, administration, and implementation systems. So, is it possible or appropriate to give this to everyone? Some should receive it. In addition to the current seven regions and seven states, we can establish more Special Regions. However, some must remain legally bound; we cannot legally let them go entirely," Dr. M. Kawn La said.

 Pa-O PNO soldiers seen together.

Before 1958, under the 1947 Constitution, the Shan, Kachin, Kayah (Karenni), and Karen states held separate state statuses. State governments were formed with representatives from their respective state councils and exercised certain administrative powers.

During that era, a bicameral parliamentary system was used, featuring a Chamber of Nationalities for non-Bamar ethnic groups. In this chamber, representatives of non-Bamar ethnicities were granted seats based on state-specific rights rather than population ratio, allowing them to negotiate a balance of power almost equal to that of the Bamar ethnic group.

In 1958, ethnic groups held a high political status that legally included the right to self-determination and the right to secede from the Union.

Currently, ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) are demanding a status similar to the "Wa" or a "Confederation" status, and are engaged in armed struggle to achieve these goals.