CNI Articel
18 September 2025
India and Myanmar share a border of over 1,000 kilometers. In addition, the peoples living in India’s northeastern region and the peoples in Myanmar are anthropologically similar in appearance.
India’s Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Mizoram, and Manipur states border Myanmar’s Sagaing Region, Kachin State, and Chin State.
Alongside this geographic proximity, India believes that armed groups waging insurgency against it—such as the Meitei, Mizo, Kuki, and Naga—are based and operating in areas inside Myanmar adjacent to the border.
The presence of these insurgent groups, combined with instability in Myanmar’s border regions, has become an obstacle to India’s northeastern development plans and its “Act East Policy.” Therefore, India is strongly intent on building greater peace and stability in its northeast as well as along the India–Myanmar border.
Because of instability along the India–Myanmar border, India has faced the following situations:
The suspension of the India–Myanmar Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project.
The failure to implement the $4 billion India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway Project.
The halting of border trade between the two countries.
The necessity of sheltering Myanmar refugees in India.
The suspension of the India–Myanmar–China Ledo Road renovation project.
India’s inability to pursue its resource extraction goals inside Myanmar.
Weakening of the rule of law in India’s northeastern region.
Delays in the development of India’s northeastern region.
For these reasons, India considers stability and the rule of law inside Myanmar and along the shared border essential, and it now appears to be contemplating deeper involvement in Myanmar’s current political situation than before.
The reason for saying this is that, on August 31, 2025, in Tianjin, China, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the State Security and Peace Commission Chairman, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, met and discussed (1) enhancing military security and defense cooperation between the two countries’ armed forces, and (2) cooperation on mineral extraction. These two points were publicly announced by Prime Minister Modi himself, while there may also be deeper, undisclosed matters behind the scenes.
Following this, a delegation of five officials led by Lieutenant General Ko Ko Oo, Commander of the Bureau of Special Operations (1), visited India and, on September 10, 2025, met with Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi in New Delhi.
During this meeting, they mainly discussed strengthening defense cooperation, expanding military relations, and reaffirming mutual commitments to regional peace and stability, according to the Indian Army.
Similarly, on September 12, 2025, Lieutenant General Ko Ko Oo met with Lieutenant General R.C. Tiwari, Commander of India’s Eastern Command, and other senior officials.
During this meeting, the Indian Army presented plans to provide the Myanmar Tatmadaw with modern IT lab equipment to improve digital training capabilities and information management systems. This presentation highlighted India’s support for upgrading Myanmar’s defense infrastructure and for strengthening bilateral cooperation through technology.
Lieutenant General Ko Ko Oo is the Commander of the Bureau of Special Operations (1), which oversees the Northwestern Command (Sagaing Region, northern Magway Region, and Chin State), the Northern Command (Kachin State), and the Central Command (Mandalay Region and southern Magway Region).
Thus, the Bureau of Special Operations (1) covers Kachin State, Sagaing Region, Magway Region, Chin State, and Mandalay Region.
India borders precisely these areas—Sagaing, Chin, and Kachin—where Naga and Meitei insurgent groups hostile to India are based.
Following this, on September 13, 2025, Prime Minister Modi visited Aizawl, Mizoram, a state bordering Myanmar and affected by instability, where he met with the state chief minister and local residents, delivering speeches.
Likewise, on September 14, 2025, Modi visited Imphal, Manipur State, where he also met with the chief minister and residents and gave speeches.
These developments show that India–Myanmar relations have been shifting since August. Whether these changes will bring stability and rule of law along the India–Myanmar border remains to be seen.
It will also be important to watch whether the two key points mentioned above can be realized and whether the eight challenges listed earlier can be addressed with positive outcomes.
In any case, if India and Myanmar’s governments and militaries cooperate to build stability and the rule of law along the border, there could be significant impacts on groups such as the Arakan Army (AA), Chin armed organizations (CNF, CNDF, Chin PDFs), Naga, Meitei, Mizo, Kuki, as well as Sagaing-based PDFs and the Kachin Independence Army’s military support in Sagaing.
For this reason, India–Myanmar relations are of great interest, and it remains to be seen how they will develop.
